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THE NEWSPAPER RATE DIFFERENTIAL AND
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT OF
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
ABSTRACT
The FTC began intensive enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act
regulations dealing with discriminatory advertising allowances for the
first time in 1963. Previous enforcement efforts had been mild by com-
parison and the literature clearly marks a turning point in FTC efforts
in 1963.
One target of the FTC's effort was cooperative advertising and
"double billing" which allowed some retailers to gain an edge over com-
petitors.
As the FTC's enforcement efforts tended to modify business and
advertising media behavior, with respect to double billing, the news-
paper rate differential was reduced. This outcome was not intended by
the FTC.
The newspaper rate differential, reflecting the difference between
the national and local advertising rates charged by newspapers, is a
long standing institution in this country and its existence merely
reflects advertising media pricing in two distinct markets. The unex-
pected outcome from the FTC's action demonstrates again that regulation
sometimes causes unintended results, as argued in several previous
studies.

THE NEWSPAPER RATE DIFFERENTIAL AND
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT OF
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
By Walter J. Primeaux, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The higher rates charged by newspapers for national advertising
than for retail (local) advertising have been the subject of several
previous studies. Ferguson was the first to make a systematic analy-
sis. After carefully examining seven facts or conditions as possible
causes of the newspaper rate differential, he finally rejected all but
the joint product hypothesis which was found to be the only explanation
of the difference.
Simon found strong evidence that the demand for retail advertising
was higher than the demand for national advertising. His study argued
that the price discrimination explanation, previously dismissed as un-
important by Ferguson, is at least a partial explanation of the dif-
ference between retail and national newspaper rates. Simon's research
2
identified a number of potential problems with Ferguson's earlier work.
Although Ferguson and Simon's contributions to our understanding of
the newspaper rate differential are extremely important, they have not
completely explained either its source or characteristics. This addi-
tional study was undertaken to expand generally our understanding of
^University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
James M. Ferguson, The Advertising Rate Structure in the Daily
Newspaper Industry (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963)
2
Julian L. Simon, "The Cause of the Newspaper Rate Differential:
A Subjective Demand Curve Analysis," Journal of Political Economy 73,
No. 5 (October 1965): 536.
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this phenomenon. More specifically, this additional research has three
purposes. First, to examine the impact of competition among adver-
tising media on the newspaper rate differential. Second, to explain
the nature of "double billing" and to examine its impact on the
newspaper rate differential. Third, to examine the effects of the
FTC's 1963 intensified action against "double billing" and its effect
on the newspaper rate differential.
THE NATURE OF DOUBLE BILLING AND COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING
The Procedure
Double billing depends upon cooperative advertising for its exis-
tence. Cooperative advertising is partly paid for by the retailer and
partly paid for by the manufacturer or wholesaler of a product. Es-
sentially, the ad promotes both the local establishment and a national
product it sells; the advertising actually combines a local establish-
ment's ad with a manufacturers' ad. The joint nature of the adver-
tising brings into play some form of cost sharing by the local retailer
and the manufacturer or wholesaler. The cost sharing arrangement has
caused a practice to develop which is known as "double billing" where
the medium renders two bills to the local retailer who originally
negotiated for the advertising. Essential to the discussion is the
fact that the medium is actually willing to contract for advertising
with the retailer at a local rate which is lower than the national
3
A recent study of other aspects of government regulation in the
iaper industry is: Michael 0. Wirt and Bruce T. Allen, "Crossmedia
Ownership, Regulatory Scrutiny, and Pricing Behavior," Journal of
lomics and Business, 33, (1980-1981): 28-42.
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rate. So, the medium engaging in the double billing practice issues
two bills: one for the advertising charge at the higher national rate
and another bill at the lower retail rate. The retailer then submits
the higher bill at the national rate to the manufacturer or wholesaler
as a basis for claiming reimbursement of some previously agreed to
share of the total advertising bill; he actually pays only the lower
(local) bill.
4
Such an arrangement causes the retailer to pay something less than
the percentage specified by the cooperative advertising plan. This
outcome occurs because the retailer pays the total bill owed the medium
at the local rate and is reimbursed by the manufacturer at the national
rate. Since the national rate is higher than the retail rate, the
retailer reaps the benefit from double billing. The double billing
practice is explained in more detail in the following discussion.
Cooperative advertising plans vary but one common arrangement is that
the retailer agrees to pay 50 percent of the cost of an ad and the
manufacturer agrees to pay the remaining 50 percent. From the previous
discussion, it is clear that whenever double billing is used, the
4
Double billing and the cooperative advertising arrangements are
discussed in a number of references including Vertical Cooperative
Advertising Report of the Committee on Cooperative Advertising (New
York: Association of the National Advertisers, n.d.). This publica-
tion is not dated but the text shows that it was published sometime
immediately after the end of WWII. Cooperative advertising allowances
are also discussed in Leverette S. Lyon, Advertising Allowances
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1932). The dates on the
above sources show that use of double billing with cooperative adver-
tising is a rather long standing practice. For a more up-to-date dis-
cussion see: "Lawyer's Advice: Co-op Linage Hurt by Double Billing,"
Editor and Publisher (March 30, 1963), p. 123.
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retailer pays less than the agreed portion of the advertising charge,
according to the cooperative advertising plan. Moreover, large firms
with monopsony power may get much better than a 5U-50 plan; so these
firms may even make profits from cooperative advertising and double
billing. This outcome occurs because they collect more in "reimburse-
ment" than they actually pay for the advertising.
it is impossible to assess accurately the total dollar amount of
this joint or cooperative advertising within the economy; however,
there are estimates that it accounts for as much as 25-35 percent of
6
store advertising expenditures. Obviously, any change which dramati-
cally affects cooperative advertising practices would have a signifi-
cant impact on both the advertising industry and the rates charged
within the industry; the FTC's 1963 action to curb double billing
practices was such a change. This impact will be examined later in this
paper.
For double billing to "work", a rate differential must exist between
the national and local rate. Local media compete with one another and
if one medium accommodates retail stores and uses double billing and
"Big Stores, Chains Are Chief Culprits in Co-op Ad Abuses Senate
Unit Told," Advertising Age (August 17, I9b4), p. 75.
Harold H. Bennett, "Newspapers Have a Stake: The Retailer's Case
for Co-op Ad Funds," Editor and Publisher (August 11, 1962), p. 15. In
this article, the author points out that it is doubtful whether anyone
really knows the total dollar amount of cooperative advertising. See
also "Cooperative Ad Plan Benefits Described," Editor and Publisher
(September 21, 1963), p. 22. Numerous telephone calLs to various trade
ociations, as well as another thorough review of trade and scholarly
literature, failed to uncover the amount of cooperative advertising
within the economy. Thus, Bennett's statement is upheld.
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another does not, the one providing that option will gain an edge over
its competitors. Newspapers, as well as other media, can obviously
sell more local advertising if retailers are actually relieved of most
Q
of the cost of paying for ads because double billing is used.
Consequently, advertising media have a real stake in having a national
and local advertising rate to facilitate the double billing practice;
moreover, they also have a stake in being willing to facilitate the
practice by furnishing a double bill. One billing being for the real
charge to the retailer at the local rate net of quantity discounts
earned by his advertising volume through the year. A second billing
being at the national rate which is always higher.
As mentioned earlier, the retailer pays the bill for the lower
local charge and sends the higher bill with the national charge in to
the manufacturer to claim his share of the cooperative advertising
refund. If the local rate is 50 percent of the national rate, and if
the dealer has a 50-50 sharing agreement with the manufacturer, he
would receive advertising without cost; this would occur because his
claim would be for 50 percent of the national rate which is twice as
high as the local rate, so his proceeds would equal the amount of the
real bill he received for advertising.
This competition is discussed in Edward C. Crimmins, A Management
Guide to Co-operative Advertising
, New York: Association of National
Advertisers, 1970, p. 16.
8
The focus of attention here is upon double billing by newspapers;
it is important to mention, however, that it also occurs in the other
media.
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Why Manufacturers Tolerate Double billing
The following discussion relates more to the environment in which
double billing took place prior to 1963. Yet, the information also
applies whenever double billing exists today.
One should not infer from the double billing process that manufac-
turers do not demonstrate profit maximizing behavior whenever that
practice is employed. Indeed, this is far from the case. Moreover,
one cannot conclude that the double billing practice necessarily leads
to exploitation of manufacturers. These statements are based upon
the three main propositions presented in the following paragraphs.
First, large, successful retailers are in a position to switch pro-
duct lines if a manufacturer enforces the cooperative advertising
agreement too judiciously. That is, some manufacturers have signifi-
cant incentives to not police cooperative advertising very carefully.
Indeed, many large retailers sell several brands and their switching
costs to discontinue a brand are relatively low. Indeed, it was the
discriminatory allowances for cooperative advertising, and the alleged
anticompetitive effects caused by some firms receiving "favored treat-
ment" with respect to cooperative advertising and double billing, which
triggered the FTC's 1963 enforcement efforts. So one must not conclude
that manufacturers are all unaware of double billing or that its
existence reflects nonprofit maximization behavior by the manufacturer.
In fact, the opposite argument could be made.
9
Cooperative Advertising Report ... op. cit. This source
indicates that although manufacturers do not generally approve of this
tice, they probably would not object in the case of powerful re-
tailers.
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A second important reason why double billing actually can occur is
that it is extremely difficult to guard against the practice. In the
first place, printed rate cards (showing both the national and local
rates) clearly provide "evidence" to any inquiring manufacturer
suspecting double billing that the billed rate conforms to the legiti-
mate price of the medium. However, discounts given to retailers
because of their volume purchases of advertising through the year can-
not be ascertained by the manufacturer. Moreover, the medium's
willingness to settle for the lower local rate, instead of the higher
national rate to acquire the retailer's advertising business in com-
petition with other media, is a necessary ingredient in the double
billing procedure. This condition does not provide any visible signs
which the conscientious manufacturer can rely upon as evidence of a
violation of the cooperative advertising agreements by the retailer
employing double billing. Consequently, again, one must not conclude
that the existence of double billing reflects non profit maximizing
behavior by the manufacturer.
A third explanation of why the double billing practice is accepted
and not totally eliminated by manufacturers must include the fact that
some suppliers are actually unsuspecting and do not realize that double
12billing is being practiced. This is not to say that the manufacturers
10
The intense competitive nature of double billing is explained in
"Can the F.T.C. Cleanup Co-op?" Sales Management (April 15, 1960), p. 40
"Big Stores, chains..., op. cit.
12
Vertical Cooperative Advertising Report ... op. cit., pp. 29-30.
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are exactly duped by the retailers because of their lack, of intelli-
gence. Instead, this means that since the advertising media "collude"
with the retailer, when double billing exists, there are absolutely no
signals to suggest to a "trusting" manufacturer that double billing is
being used.
The above three factors explain why manufacturers "tolerated"
double billing prior to the widespread increased effort to curtail
13
illegal advertising and promotional allowances in fiscal 1963. The
discussion also explains why the practice still exists today.
The Need for a National Rate
The above discussion does not explain why linage is booked at the
national rate and why national advertisers do not induce local firms to
front for them so they can gain the lower local rate for national
advertising. This outcome is really not difficult to explain.
National advertisers are generally sealed off from obtaining the lower
local rate on their own; they may negotiate, but certainly they cannot
force a newspaper to sell them a National add at the local rate. So
linage is actually booked at the national rate by those manufacturing
firms who are unable to force from the media the lower local rate for
their national advertising. Of course, some media are even willing to
sell advertising to national advertisers at local rates.
13
The increased enforcement activity is documented in: Annual
of the Federal Trade Commission (Washington, D.C.: Federal Trade
Commission, June 3u , 1963, p. 2.
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...[Some] radio and television stations charge
national advertisers who submit advertising directly
to the station a local rate because commissions
need not be paid to agencies.-*- 4
The above discussion shows that the national rate continues to serve
a useful function even though double billing exists. First, because
national advertisers cannot always induce media to grant them the lower
local rate and retailers have no incentive to enter into such negotia-
tions on behalf of manufacturers. Since the media control content of
the advertising, it is impossible for a manufacturer to deceive the
media by arguing that an ad is really a combined ad for a local retailer
and a manufacturer. Consequently, these difficulties force manufac-
turers to continue to buy national advertising at the higher national
rate. For these reasons, the national rate continues to exist.
Moreover, all media do not engage in double billing. Consequently,
in situations where it is not used, the national rate actually repre-
sents a transactions price which the media actually intend to collect
for advertising; so in those cases, the national rate is necessary
because it represents a true price.
Even for firms practicing double billing, the national rate serves
a very worthwhile purpose. For these firms, the value of the national
rate originates from two sources. First, these media have the power to
charge national advertisers the national rate for reasons mentioned
above. At the same time, they also have the power to negotiate price
concessions with local advertisers, who insist on receiving the lower
14
r.Ferguson, op. cit., p. 20.
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local rate because of advertising availability on double billing bases
from competitive media.
Interdependence of Cooperative Advertising
and Double Billing
In fact, the double billing and cooperative advertising practices
16
described above have existed over a long period of time. From the
previous discussion, one would expect the following to be true. First,
double billing and cooperative advertising work together. Double
billing cannot exist without cooperative advertising. Second, media
which employ double billing largely view the national rate as
fictitious because they are actually willing to sell advertising to
retailers at the local rate. From these propositions, one would expect
that any significant external pressure on the practice of double
billing would affect the newspaper rate differential.
The Intensified Efforts of F.T.C.
During the early I9b0's there began an intense effort by the Federal
Trade Commission to enforce the discriminatory allowance provisions of
the Robinson-Patman Act which affected both the degree of utilization
of cooperative advertising and the mechanical procedures involved in
It was the power of large retailers to negotiate discriminatory
advertising allowances from manufactures, and their power to evoke
double billing from the media, which intensified FTC enforcement of the
Robinson-Patman Act in 1963: "Lawyer's Advice: Co-op Linage Hurt by
Double Billing," op. cit., p. 123 and "Big Stores, Chains... op. cit.,
p. 75.
16
tLyon, op. cit.
its use. Prior to that time, efforts to enforce this provision of the
Robinson-Patman Act were very weak but the events in 1960 clearly
generated a set of circumstances which created a trauma never before
experienced in the advertising industry. The fact that the FTC did not
seriously enforce the discriminatory allowance provisions of the
Robinson-Patman Act prior to the 1960 T s, as well as the necessity of
changes in cooperative procedures because of its intensified efforts,
is reported in a number of business publications. The background
surrounding this situation and its effect on the advertising media as
well as business is well documented in the business literature. The
obvious turning point with respect to enforcement occurred in 1963,
when the FTC required 248 apparel makers to sign consent decrees or
face litigation; from then on, cooperative advertising programs would
never be the same. The year 1963 must be designated as a year of
significant change in cooperative advertising.
The record number of cases in fiscal 1963 also reflect meaningful
enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act. "A new all time record was set
These facts are confirmed in "F.T.C. Co-op Blast May Cut Ad
Revenue," Editor and Publisher (June 30, 1962), p. 16 and Cameron Day,
"Why Co-op Advertising Will Surge Ahead," Sales Management (October 4,
1963), p. 49.
18
The following selected references reflect both the increased
intensity of the F.T.C.'s effort and the buildup to a peak in 1963:
Advertising Age (September 14, 1959), p. 1; "FTC Issues Guides on
Promotional Allowances," Advertising Age (June 6, 1960), p. 1; "F.T.C.
Cleanup Is on: Can Manufacturers Regain Control of Co-op Advertising
Dollars?" Sales Management (April 7, 1961), pp. 75-76; "F.T.C. Co-op
Blast May Cut Ad Revenue," op. cit., p. 16; "Can Co-op Ads Survive
F.T.C.'s Broadside?" Business Week (February 23, 1963), pp. 86-88;
Cameron Day, op. cit., p. 49.
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with issuance of 454 cease and desist orders, including 261 in the
anti-monopoly field. The previous high was 407 orders in fiscal
19
1962." This statement, too, reflects the new level of attention and
enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission. Of course, this citation
refers to all areas of FTC activity and its reference is not restricted
only to the advertising allowance problem which is of primary concern
to this paper. The FTC clarified in its report, however, that the com-
mission was indeed engaged in widespread increased effort to curtail
20
illegal advertising and promotional allowances in fiscal 1963.
The statistical analysis presented later was seriously in need
of validating the point where the FTC enforcement efforts against
discriminatory advertising allowances were intensified, so indices of
periodical literature were reviewed to determine if there was, in fact,
more FTC activity concerning advertising allowances in 1963; the
increased activity, if it did actually exist, would be reflect in a
larger number of listings of articles dealing with that question in
that year.
The turning point in 1963 in FTC interest with price discrimination
problems associated with promotional allowances is substantiated in the
count of listings from the indices of periodical literature. A tabula-
tion of the number of acticles appearing in indices during the years
1938-1974 which were concerned with the legality of promotional
19
Report of the Federal Trade Commission , op. cit., p. 2.
20
Ibid, pp. 2-4.
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allowances is presented in Table 1. Data from the table show that 34
percent of the total number of articles appeared in the 24 year
period 1938-1961; 30 percent were listed in the 2 year period
1962-1963; 36 percent were published in the 11 year period 1964-1974.
These numbers reveal that the 2 year period 1962-1963 accounted for
almost as large a precentage of articles as the earlier 24 year period.
Moreover, the 1964-1974 11 year time period accounted for a slightly
larger percentage of published articles than the earlie 24 year period.
These data not only illustrate the strong change in trend in 1962-1963
but they also show the continued higher interest in this problem after
the turning point in 1963.
One may roughly divide the impact of the intensified government
attention in cooperative advertising into six categories: (1) the
intensified effort frightened advertisers; (2) advertisers were con-
22
fused by terms used in the commission's rulings; (3) the commission's
effort provided a good excuse to firms who did not want to use promo-
23
tional allwances to discontinue using them (they had felt compelled
21
This effect is discussed in "Can Co-op Ads Survive F.T.C.'s
Broadside?," op. cit., p. 88; Crimmins, op. cit., p. 16.
22
This confusion is discussed in "Confusion on F.T.C.
Discriminatory Ad Rule Hurts Us, Retailers Say: Ask Clarification,"
Advertising Age (February 25, 1963), p. 26; "F.T.C. Co-op Blast May Cut
Ad Revenue," op. cit., p. 16.
23
This behavior was discussed in "Can Co-op Ads survive F.T.C.'s
Broadside?" op. cit., p. 86; "Confusion on F.T.C. Discriminatory Ad
Rule Hurts Us, Retailers Say: Ask. Clarification," Ibid.
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TABLE 1
NUMBER OF ARTICLES IN INDEXES DEALING WITH
DISCRIMINATORY PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES IN COOPERATIVE
ADVERTISING
(1938-1974)
Year
Number of
Articles Year
Number of
Articles
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1
2
1
5
2
2
1
10
2
2
1
8
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
6
5
4
7
9
28
32
13
8
4
4
14
8
7
4
7
2
Sources: 1939-57 Computations from Roberta Purdy, ed., Industrial Arts
Index (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., various); 1958-1974 computations
H.from Lucille V. Craumer, ed., Business Periodicals Index (New York:
W. Wilson Co., various). Business periodicals were originally indexed
in Industrial Arts Index ; however, in I95d H. W. Wilson Co., discon-
tinued that index and issued the first Business Periodicals Index.
15-
to use them because of competitive pressure); (4) the commission's
ruling encouraged those who continued to use cooperative advertising to
24
be very careful to avoid discrimination practices; (5) because of
manufacturers' reaction to the rulings, advertisers had less cooperative
advertising money to spend; (6) the enforcement made manufacturers
install plans which avoided past problems and eliminated opportunities
26
for continued abuse of cooperative advertising.
The commission was interested in discriminatory advertising
allowances, particularly cooperative advertising which may have given
one retail firm a larger allowance than another firm under identical
conditions. Manufacturers were required to offer similar plans to all
dealers operating under substantially similar conditions; however, they
were not required to offer identical plans to all dealers. The mere
nature of cooperative advertising presented a problem to manufacturers
sharing cost of advertising with retailers; to avoid charges of price
discrimination, firms could no longer make allowances which favored one
customer over another. Moreover, the double-billing practice which had
developed through the years actually intensified this problem; whenever
double billing is employed, both the manufacturer and the retailer are
24
This effect was explained in Crimmins, op. cit., p. 118 and "Can
Co-op ads Survive F.T.C.'s Broadside? op. cit., pp. 86-88.
25
"Confusion on F.T.C. Discriminatory Ad Rule..." op. cit., p. 20;
"Can Co-op Ads Survive... op. cit., pp. 86-88.
9 ft
This corrective measure was discussed in Bennett, op. cit., p. 15
and Crimmins, op. cit., pp. 23-24n.
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in a position of being charged with discriminatory allowances because
all firms do not receive the same allowance. This disciminatory prac-
tice is particularly difficult for manufacturers to guard against
because they are frequently unaware that double billing is being
27
employed.
The previous list of effects of intensified FTC action concerning
advertising leads to the logical conclusion that cooperative adver-
tising practices were changed significantly by the FTC's enforcement
efforts. The intense enforcement effort seemed to reduce the amount of
cooperative advertising; moreover, manufacturing firms were forced to
modify existing plans to avoid discriminatory practices and to take
steps to avoid abuses by retailers (particularly double billing) which
could cause legal difficulties. The net effect was to change sub-
stantially existing cooperative advertising plans; plans which were
instituted later were also affected.
The impact of the FTC's changed attitude toward advertising regula-
tions may be more fully emphasized by acknowledging that one authority
has asserted that the Robinson-Patman Act and the legal problems
surrounding every co-op program now constitute the largest single dis-
advantage of instituting or continuing a cooperative advertising
28
program.
27
As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, manufacturers do not
generally approve of this practice, but probably would not object in
the case of powerful retailers. This point is made in Vertical
Cooperative Advertising Report op. cit., pp. 29-30.
28
Crimmins, op. cit., p. 60.
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Up to this point, it has been explained that in 1963 a turning
point occurred which seriously changed advertising plans and coopera-
29
tive advertising. This change also had a significant effect on
double billing, which at one time was common practice but which was
explicitly ruled to be illegal by the FTC in their action of the
1960 's. Moreover, the impact of these changes fell most heavily upon
30
newspapers. Therefore, it is entirely plausible that such occurren-
ces should affect the newspaper rate differential, because cooperative
advertising and double billing were dramatically affected and both were
widely used in the newspaper industry.
The previous discussion leads to the following conclusions: First,
double billing is dependent upon cooperative advertising for its
existence. Without cooperative advertising, double billing could not
exist. Second, newspaper are "forced" to participate in double billing
because of competitive pressures. Third, the existence of double
billing causes newspapers to receive only a rate equivalent to the
local rate, even though the manufacturer actually reimburses the dealer
at the national rate. Fourth, the fact that the newspaper receives
only the local rate really reflects that it charges the national rate
on the double bill only to accommodate customers. Fifth, since
newspapers using double billing must have a difference between local and
national rates, cooperative advertising and double billing help to
explain why the newspaper rate differential exists.
29
This impact was acknowledged in Can Co-op Ads Survive... op.
cit
. ,
p. 86.
30
Ibid; "Co-op Advertising Dead?" Broadcasting (October 3, 1962),
p. 51.
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The above discussion of cooperative advertising and double billing
reveals that these practices would tend to cause the national rate and
the retail rate for advertising to be different. This assertion does
not seem to be unreasonable because a priori one would expect newspapers
which extensively engage in this practice to gravitate toward a single
rate if for some reason cooperative advertising and double billing were
discontinued. Indeed, this is probably what actually occurred after
the 1963 turning point.
If the hypothesis presented at the beginning of this paper is true,
one would expect the data showing the variance between national and
retail advertising rates to reflect the intensified FTC activity, the
impact on cooperative advertising, and the ensuing decline in the
newspaper rate differential.
The turning point in FTC activity in 1963 and the downward trend in
the rate variance thereafter are identical with the movements reflected
in Table 2. Table 2 presents a history of the rate differential since
1938. The data show that from 1938 through 1963 the trend of the rate
variance was generally upward, increasing from a low of 43.4 present in
1938 to a high of 61.7 percent in 1963.
After the turning point in 1963, the variance began a downward
trend; and in 1979, the variance of 52.9 percent was slightly lower
than that existing in 1947. These data are certainly consistent with
the institutional changes discussed earlier and reflect support of the
hypothesis that the newspaper rate differential was affected by FTC
tion on cooperative advertising practices. A more rigorous test of
hypothesis is presented in a later section of this paper.
-19-
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE BY WHICH GENERAL (NATIONAL)
RATE EXCEEDS RETAIL (LOCAL) RATE
Year Dai!Lies Year Dailies
(Beginning (General (Beginning (General
January 1) vs. Retail) January 1) vs. Retail)
1938 43..4 1959 59,.4
1939 44,,7 1960 59,.5
1940 46,.3 1963* 61,.7
1941 46,.8 1964 58,.1
1942 47,.6 1965 55,.7
1943 48,.6 1966 55,.2
1944 49,.8 1967 r
1945 r 1968 49,.4
1946 50.,0 1969 r
1947 53,.6 1970+ 50,.4
1948 51,.8 1970 40,.7
1949 53,.9 1971 50,.0
1950 55,,7 1972 48,.3
1951§ 53.,4 1973 48,.2
1952 53,.6 1974 49,,5
1953 54..5 1975 50,.3
1954 55..6 1976 50,.5
1955 55..9 1977 50,.6
1956 56..5 1978 51,.1
1957 57..7 1979 52,,9
1958 59..5
SOURCES—American Association of Advertising Agencies and Newspaper
Advertising Bureau.
NOTE—James M. Ferguson, The Advertising Rate Structure in the
Daily Newspaper Industry (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1963) p. 64, explains that some data prior to 1938 were not reliable.
His comment is the basis for using 1938 as the beginning year in this
table.
*in 1963, method of computing was simplified so that study could be
made more current; hence Che omission of 1961 and 1962.
t Study not compiled.
+ Rates effective September 1969.
§ Beginning 1951, percentage differntial rates are shown by ABC
City Zone Population 50,000 and over.
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A STATISTICAL TEST OF DOUBLE BILLING AS A
FACTOR AFFECTING THE NEWSPAPER RATE DIFFERENTIAL
The Theory
The newspaper rate differencial is affected by four different types
of factors. The first type reflects competition with other advertising
media; the second type reflects the individual newspaper's market power
in selling newspaper advertising; the third type reflects the individual
newspaper's market power in selling newspaper to consumer; the fourth
is more rigorous enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act concerning
cooperative advertising and double billing practices. The rationale
for these expectations follows.
Radio and television advertising are substitute for newspaper
advertising and provide alternatives to advertisers. As the ratio of
radio advertising to total advertising increases, the newspaper rate
differential could tend to decline. The same result could occur as the
ratio of television advertising to total advertising increased. These
are the competitive effects which are caused by the newspaper's share
loss to other media, as the newspaper adjusts the rates it charges for
advertising. If the national market is threatened, however, the
newspaper will lower national rates, relative to local rates, causing
the newspaper rate differential to decline. If, instead, the local
market is threatened, the newspaper will lower local rates, relative to
national rates, causing the differential to increase. Consequently,
the nature of the price adjustment by the newspaper depends upon the
market which is affected.
If newspapers as a group experienced an increase in their share of
advertising, because of a relative increase in volume of their
-21-
local advertising, they would be inclined to reduce the newspaper rate
differential. That is, they would be more inclined to raise local
rates relative to their national rates, thus causing the rate differ-
ential to decline. Although they would be reacting to market forces,
their behavior would tend to reduce the rate differential. In
contrast, if the increase in their share of total advertising came from
a relative increase in their volume of national advertising, newspapers
would tend to increase the newspaper rate differential. This result
would occur because the increase demand for national advertising would
tend to raise national rates with respect to local rates.
The rate differential would also be affected by the market power of
a given newspaper in selling advertising. This market power would be
refelcted in a decline in the number of newspapers, which would tend to
increase the monopoly power of the remaining newspapers. The decline
in newspapers, of course, largely comes from the withdrawal of one of
the newspapers within a given city, and, the absence of direct com-
petition, increases the control of newspaper advertising rates by the
remaining firm. The newspaper has gained a local monopoly for local
newspaper advertising within its city but it is still subject to a high
level of competition from other newspapers for national newspaper
advertising in other markets; consequently, the increase in market
power will probably be reflected in increases in local rates because of
the newly gained monopoly position, but national rates will probably
remain unchanged because of the large number of remaining newspaper
alternatives available to national advertisers. From the above
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discussion, it follows that a decline in the number of newspaper would
cause a decrease in the newspaper rate differential.
An increase in circulation for newspaper would cause the rate dif-
ferential to fall. This change, of course, indicates, an increase in
the market power of the newspaper in selling to newspaper consumers.
To the extent that advertisers are interested in attracting more po-
tential buyers through their ads, this change would affect advertising
prices. More circulation for a given newspaper would make a given
newspaper more attractive for advertisers. To the extent that this
market power would accrue more to local than to national advertising,
it would tend to give the newspaper power to raise local rates more
than national rates. This situation, of course, would tend to reduce
the rate differential, because local rates would move upward toward the
higher national rates. This market power could occur from a decline in
the number of newspapers, instead of an increase in circulation. As in
the earlier discussion, the monopoly power of the newspaper is more
perfect in selling to advertisers at the local level instead of the
national level; consequently, it would probably raise local rates more
than national rates, tending to reduce the rate differential.
A substantial discussion of the reasons why the existence of double
billing and cooperative advertising would affect the newspaper rate
differential was presented earlier. That discussion also provided
detailed explanations of why the FTC's intensified action against
double billing and cooperative advertising in 1963 would be expected to
cause the rate differential to decline, so that discussion will not be
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repeated here. Nevertheless, it must be considered in any analysis of
the rate differential.
In summary, then, the newspaper rate differential is affected by
several forces; the relative market shares of competing advertising
media, the proportion of total advertising which is placed in newspapers,
the market power of a newspaper in selling advertising in competition
with other newspapers, the monopoly power of newspapers in selling
newspapers to consumers and the Federal Trade Commission enforcement of
the Robinson-Patman Act.
The next section discusses the model used to examine the impact of
intensified F.T.C. enforcement of the Robinson-Patman act upon the
newspaper rate differential.
The Model
The analytical framework suggests the following functional form:
Newspaper Rate Differential = f (Radio advertising's share of total
advertising, television advertising's share of total advertising,
newspaper advertising's share of total advertising, the market
power of newspaper in selling advertising, the market power of
newspapers in selling newspapers, double billing practices).
The procedure involved the use of ordinary least squares multiple
regression analysis to examine the variables thought to be important
in affecting the newspaper rate differential.
The ordinary least squares regression equation is in the form:
RDIF = A, + B.LNEW + B„LRAD + B.,LTV + B . LCIR/LNPR + B CLNADV/LNPR112 3 4 5
+ B.DBILL
6
where
:
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RDIF = The dependent variable. The newspaper advertising rate dif-
ferential (a percent difference between the national and
local rates. Reflects how much more the national adver-
tiser pays above the local rate).
LNEW = Log total newspaper advertising expenditures as a ratio of
the log of total advertising expenditures
LRAD = Log total radio advertising expenditures as a ratio of the
log of total advertising expenditures
LTV = Log total television advertising expenditures as a ratio of
the log of total advertising expenditures
LCIR/LNPR = Log total circulation of per daily newspaper (in thousand
of issues)
LNADV/LNPR = Log real newspaper advertising per newspaper (in millions
of dollars)
DBILL = A dummy variable taking a value of before 1964 and a
value of 1 thereafter
From the earlier discussion, the expected relationships between the
newspaper rate differential and the explanation variables are as
follows: 3 LNEW < 0, 3RAD < 0, 3LTV < 0, 3LCIR/3LNPR < 0,
3LNADV/3LNPR < 0, and DBILL < 0.
The sign on the coefficient of the double billing variable (DBILL)
is the crucial one for testing the effect of double billing on the
newspaper rate differential; a negative sign would indicate that the
double billing practice does decrease the newspaper rate differential.
This outcome, therefore, would support the fundamental hypothesis of
this study, while a positive sign would reject it.
Data sources are discussed in the appendix. Most monetary values
are expressed as ratios, so it was only necessary to deflate the data
or the LNADV/LNPR variable to remove the effects of inflation. The
1NP implicit price deflator was used for this purpose.
-25-
The data consists of time series observations for 1950 through 1979
(thirty years)
.
Empirical Results
Table 3 presents the equation developed from the model; statistics
indicate that the equation explains 89 percent of the movement in the
newspaper rate differential, when the coefficient of multiple deter-
mination is adjusted for degrees of freedom (and over 91 percent before
that adjustment). The results are quite robust with all regression
coefficients, except LNADV/LNPR, significant at the one level or
better. The Durbin-Watson test reveals that autocorrelation did not
affect the results.
The insignificant t statistic on the LNADV/LNPR variable were unex-
pected from the earlier theoretical discussion. Yet, they support the
earlier work of Simon and are in conflict with the findings of
31
Ferguson. The findings reported here tend to show that the monopoly
power gained by the elimination of a newspaper in a market seems to be
more beneficial to pricing of national advertising than to local adver-
tising. This means that the newly gained monopoly power permits or
induces the firm to raise national rates more than local rates, thus
causing the newspaper rate differential to increase. Although the
coefficient is not statistically significant, it is positive.
The most important results from the equation is that the DBILL
variable is, indeed, important in explaining an important part of
changes in the newspaper rate differential. The results show that
31
Simon, op. cit., p. 537; Ferguson, op. cit., p. 27
Variables
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
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TABLE 3
REGRESSION EQUATION
Partial
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Error
Standardized
Estimate
RDIF
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
LNEW
LRAD
LTV
LCIR/LNPR
LNADV /LNPR
DBILL
-234.795
-46.046
-32.146
-372.81b
42.666
-5.290
32.077'
9.650 ;
6.799'
129.045 ;
28.865
1.254'
-1.607
-0.731
-1.514
-0.67 7
-0.302
-0.653
Summary Statistic
N (degrees of freedom plus number of variables) 30
R .9151
T2 .8929
D.W. 1.915
Constant 353.858
F Statistic 41.312'
Significant at 1 percent level.
Significant at 5 percent level.
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rigorous enforcement of the Robins-Patman Act provisions against double
billing and discriminatory advertising practices caused the newspaper
rate differential to decline. The coefficient on the DBILL variable
indicates that the differential (the percentage by which the national
rate exceeds the local rate) declined by over five and one quarter per-
cent (5.290). This is not a trivial reduction, and it does indicate
that double billing is actually another important element in the expla-
nation of why the newspaper rate differential exists. As reflected in
the standardized regression coefficients, however, other factors were
actually more important than the DBILL variable.
The standardized regression coefficients are presented in Table 3
and they indicate the relative importance of each variable used in the
regression equation in explaining the newspaper rate differential.
These coefficients show that, in the equation specified here, the share
of newspaper advertising as a ratio of total advertising is the most
important factor affecting the rate differential; the second most
important variable is the share of television advertising as a ratio to
total advertising; the third most important factor is the share of
radio advertising as a ratio of total advertising. These three
variables represent the important competitive effects in selling adver-
tising.
The fourth most important variable is circulation per newspaper,
representing market power in selling newspapers to consumers; and the
fifth most important factor is the DBILL variable.
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RESULT OF F.T.C. ACTION
The F.T.C.'s concern about discrminatory advertising practices was
not directed toward the newspaper rate differential at all. The con-
cerns in the 1963 time period were with the issues surrounding the
cooperative advertising practices mentioned earlier in this study. Yet,
the FTC's action had a significant unintended impact on the newspaper
rate differential. Given sufficient reflection, however, the impact
should have been expected. The logic for this statement follows.
The F.T.C. action against double billing more effectively separated
the markets facing the advertising media. Consequently, the elastici-
ties of demand between the two markets should have even diverged even
further. Moreover, the FTC action would make the local and national
markets more separable and even more capable of being sealed off to
prevent national advertisers from buying advertising at the local
32
rate. Overall, these effects, at a minimum, should have maintained
the newspaper rate differential at levels existing at that time and
could have even caused pressure for it to widen; yet, as the above data
show the FTC action caused the differential to decline.
The reduction in the newspaper rate differential was actually caused
by a combination of business and media reaction to the F.T.C.'s enforce-
ment efforts against illegal double billing practices.
Business reacted to the F.T.C.'s effort in the following ways: (1)
the Commission's ruling encouraged those who continued to use coopera-
tive advertising to be very careful to avoid discrimination practices,
32
As mentioned earlier, this was not a general problem; yet, to the
extent that it had existed prior to the change in enforcement, it dimi-
nished in importance after the change.
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particularly double billing; (2) the enforcement made manufacturers
install plans which avoided past problems and eliminated opportunities
34
for continued misuse of cooperative advertising. Many manufacturers
who had tolerated double billing practices by retailers with monopsony
power were induced to curtail those activities by the F.T.C.'s inten-
sified enforcement efforts. Moreover, some manufacturers who had been
lax in strictly enforcing terms of their cooperative advertising
contracts with retailers became more diligent. This discussion shows
that "opportunities" for double billing declined after 1963 because of
manufacturer reaction to the F.T.C. enforcement efforts against
discriminatory advertising practices.
As mentioned earlier, newspapers which engaged in double billing
really quoted a fictitiously high national rate to facilitate that
practice. After double billing was attacked by the F.T.C, many news-
papers discontinued the practice; consequently, the newspaper rate
differential declined because the "need" for the differential diminished
for those newspapers who had previously engaged in double billing prior
to the F.T.C.'s intensified enforcement effort but discontinued the
33
This effect was explained in Crimmins, op. cit., p. 16 and "Can
Co-op Ads Survive F.T.C.'s Broadside?" op. cit. Double billing tends
to create price discrimination among the retail dealers engaging in the
practice.
34
Harold H. Bennett, op. cit., p. 15. Edward C. Crimmins, Ibid.,
p. 16.
35
Double billing has declined in importance but it still exists,
according to discussions with newspaper and retail dealers.
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practice after the turmoil of 1963. The effect was most dramatic for
those newspapers which did not actually sell very much national adver-
tising but had maintained a wide difference between their local and
national rate to facilitate the double billing process, as mentioned
earlier. When double billing declined in importance, the need for such
a gap between rates ceased to exist, causing the national and local
rates to diminish in size.
CONCLUSIONS
Competition from other media, as well as the relative market power
of newspapers significantly affect the newspaper rate differential, but
they do not completely explain its existence. The need for higher
national rates to facilitate the double billing process is apparently a
significant factor affecting the existence of the newspaper rate
differential. Rigorous enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act helped
curb double billing and this tended to decrease the need for such a
wide difference between the local and national rates. This result
occurred because participation by media and retailers in the double
billing practice declined after the action by the FTC in 1963.
F.T.C. action against discriminatory advertising practices in 1963
tended to reduce the newspaper rate differential, although that was not
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intended. This result reflects "spillover" effects which sometimes
37
occur and cause regulatory action to yield unintended results.
37
Some studies reporting regulatory outcomes inconsistent with
conventional expectations; or mentioning uncertainty of regulatory
outcomes or problems with regulation include: George R. Neumann and
Jon P. Nelson, "Safety Regulation and Firm Size: Effects of the Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969," Journal of Law and Economics
,
vol. XXV(2), October 1982, pp. 183-199; George J. Stigler, "The Theory
of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics , vol. 2, no. 1,
Spring 1971, pp. 3-21; Thomas G. Moore, "The Purpose of Licensing,"
The Journal of Law and Economics, October 1961, pp. 93-117.
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APPENDIX
The Data and Sources
Data for total advertising expenditures, newspaper advertising
expenditures, total radio advertising, total television advertising
expenditures and total daily newspaper circulation are all from The U.S.
Statistical Abstract for the years 1949 through 1980. Data for the
number of newspapers were taken from the Statistical Abstract
,
various
years and Historical Statistics of the U.S. , various years.
The newspaper rate differential is computed by the American Associa-
tion of Advertising Agencies, Inc.
The DBILL dummy variable for double billing was established by
reference to business periodicals where it was determined that a turn-
ing point occurred in 1963 with respect to enforcement of Robinson-
Patman regulations. At that time, double billing was explicitly ruled
to be illegal, but it continues to exist. Moreover, cooperative adver-
tising plans and regulations were carefully modified by many firms when
strict enforcement took, place.
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